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LOCKING THE BOARDROOM DOOR: WHAT CAN 
GEORGIA COURTS LEARN FROM RECENT 
DELAWARE POISON PILL DECISIONS? 
Alan M. Long 
INTRODUCTION 
Public corporations have always been plagued by the threat of 
hostile takeovers. 1  To curb such market volatility and preserve 
company leadership, directors have turned to certain defense 
mechanisms—perhaps the most notable being shareholder rights 
plans called “poison pills.” 2  These shareholder rights plans are 
flexible, easily adopted, and highly effective in deterring 
acquisitions, tender offers, and even proxy contests. 3  Moreover, 
nearly every state has validated the use of poison pills, following the 
lead of the nation’s corporate hub—Delaware. 4  However, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery recently drafted an opinion that perhaps 
                                                                                                                 
  J.D. Candidate 2016, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank my wife, 
Ashley for her unwavering love and support and for keeping me sane throughout the publication of this 
note and each day of law school. I would also like to thank my mother, father, and sister, each for 
continuing to inspire me and push me toward my goals. In addition, I would like to thank Professor 
Anne Tucker whose advice influenced the development of this topic, and whose feedback polished the 
final draft, as well as Professor Robert Weber for his invaluable suggestions. 
 1. See David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contest: 
Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405, 405 (1993); Recent Case, Corporate Law—Takeover 
Defenses—Northern District of Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision of Poison Pill—
Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997), 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 1626, 1626 (1998) [hereinafter Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision] (“Over the past 
fifteen years, the poison pill has become one of the most widely used takeover defenses.”). 
 2. E.g., William B. Shearer III, Comment, Poison Pills: Are Dead Hand Pills Dead in Georgia?, 50 
MERCER L. REV. 809, 809 (1999); Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy 
Contests: When Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 506 (1993); see also discussion 
infra Part I.A. 
 3. See infra note 23 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part I.2–3. 
 4. Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381, 403 (2002) 
(“The legality of the poison pill is well-established [as] the courts in Delaware and many other states 
have clearly upheld the poison pill . . . .”); id. at 403 n.150 (“There is now no doubt as to the legality of 
the poison-pill rights plans. The ‘flip-in’ feature of the plan was held, in some early cases, to violate 
state corporate law. These rulings, however, have now been overruled, either judicially or by legislation 
explicitly authorizing the flip-in.”) (citing 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & 
FREEZEOUTS § 6.03[4], at 6–59 (2001)). 
1
Long: Locking the Boardroom Door
Published by Reading Room, 2016
728 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
extended this validity too far.5 The court upheld a unique poison pill 
with a 10% acquisition trigger that was enacted specifically in 
anticipation of a proxy contest and strategically designed to restrain 
only the ability of activist investors to purchase outstanding stock.6 
Such director advocacy may lead down a slippery slope and raises 
the question of whether other states will continue to follow 
Delaware’s poison pill jurisprudence—particularly Georgia, which 
has diverged from Delaware corporate law in the past.7 
This Note addresses that question. First, Part I offers a general 
overview of poison pills, as well as an account of their legal 
development in Delaware and Georgia.8 Next, Part II discusses Third 
Point LLC v. Ruprecht9—a recent Delaware Court of Chancery case 
that could have a significant impact on corporate takeover law.10 
Further, Part II analyzes whether, if faced with a similar fact pattern, 
Georgia courts would follow the Court of Chancery’s lead.11 Finally, 
Part III proposes that the court in Third Point went too far in its 
holding.12 Particularly, the Delaware Court of Chancery opened the 
door for threatened boardrooms to enact unique poison pills with 
exceedingly low triggers in the interest of protecting their positions 
as incumbent directors rather than promoting the interests of the 
corporation’s shareholders.13 As such, courts, shareholders, and states 
like Georgia, which have become lost in an idea of boardroom 
protectionism, should deviate from Delaware jurisprudence and limit 
the use of such defense mechanisms.14 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See generally Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. 
Ch. May 2, 2014); see also discussion infra Part III. 
 6. See generally Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
 8. See infra Part I.A–B.1. 
 9. See generally Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part II.D. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See discussion infra Part III. 
 14. See discussion infra Part III. 
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I.   AN OVERVIEW OF POISON PILLS AND THEIR ENFORCEABILITY 
A.   Poison Pills Generally 
The term “poison pill” was coined to describe controversial, 
defensive measures “adopted . . . in response to takeover attempts or 
in advance of possible takeover attempts”15 that, when triggered, are 
“poisonous to the raider.”16 
Company directors implement poison pills through a shareholder 
rights plan.17 When a board of directors elects to use a poison pill as 
a defensive measure, its members vote to create a preferred share 
plan.18  After approval, the plan is typically “recorded as a board 
resolution or in the company bylaws” and becomes effective 
immediately.19 The plan entitles each share of common stock to a 
“dividend of one right”; accordingly, a right attaches to each 
individual share and the two become inseparable.20  In turn, these 
rights become exercisable upon the occurrence of a predetermined 
triggering event—generally a potential merger or acquisition, tender 
offer, or the purchase of a certain percentage of the company’s 
stock.21 “Once triggered, the [r]ights . . . detach from the shares and 
entitle all of the target company’s shareholders . . . to acquire 
securities at a discount.” 22  The securities that stakeholders may 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Suzanne S. Dawson et al., Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 423 (1987). 
 16. 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE: MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS § 5.01 [A] (7th ed. 2012). 
 17. E.g., Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 423. 
 18. Shearer, supra note 2, at 812; see also Lucas O. Harsh, Note, Dead Hand Poison Pills: Will 
Georgia Corporations Continue to Issue A Lethal Dose?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 665, 667–68 (2000) 
(noting that a board typically “implements a shareholder rights plan without a shareholder vote”). 
 19. Shearer, supra note 2, at 812. 
 20. William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 184 (2003) (“These rights are initially ‘stapled’ to the common stock, in the 
sense that they can only be transferred with the common stock, and are not immediately exercisable on 
issue.”); Patrick J. Thompson, Note, Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or Gavels?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
173, 176 (1989) (noting that poison pills “are implemented through the issuance of a pro rata dividend 
of ‘purchase rights’ to stockholders”). 
 21. E.g., Velasco, supra note 4, at 382. Acquiring twenty percent of a company’s stock will typically 
trigger a rights plan; however, “[t]rigger levels vary . . . with some [being] as low as 10 percent.” Harsh, 
supra note 18, at 667–68. Moreover, if ownership is threatened, a board can call an emergency meeting 
to implement a new defensive measure or lower an existing triggering percentage to curb the threat. Id. 
at 668. 
 22. Velasco, supra note 4, at 382; accord FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.01 [A] 
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purchase depend on the type of right exercised.23 Yet, no matter the 
right exercised, the result can be devastating to a hostile bidder.24 
1.   Poison Pill Variations 
Basic poison pills can be broken down into five categories: flip-
over, flip-in, back-end, convertible preferred stock, and voting 
provisions.25 Perhaps the most common poison pill category in rights 
plans are “flip-in” provisions, which allow current shareholders, 
other than the hostile bidder, to purchase newly issued stock at a 
discounted rate.26 This is effective because the surge in ownership, 
with the bidder precluded from purchasing the new stock, dilutes the 
acquirer’s ownership. 27  “Flip-over” provisions are also common. 
These provisions, often triggered by mergers, entitle rights holders to 
                                                                                                                 
(describing how each right detaches from its share and becomes exercisable upon the occurrence of a 
triggering event). 
 23. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 181–87 (detailing the five types of poison pills that “have been 
introduced since the early 1980s”); see also discussion infra Part I.A.1; discussion infra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
 24. Compare Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 
3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 209 (2005) (“The poison pill is the most potent of antitakeover defenses.”), 
with Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 426 (“Although poison pills may effectively deter certain 
inadequate or otherwise undesirable offers, management and boards of directors must recognize that the 
adoption of poison pills is neither risk free nor guaranteed effective.”), and Carney & Silverstein, supra 
note 20, at 183 (asserting that most rights plans are less effective at deterring hostile bidders than many 
believe, in part because only a fraction of the initial investment will be lost and “[o]nce the pill’s 
effectiveness ends, the illness is free to resume its course”). 
 25. This Note focuses on flip-over and flip-in provisions. However, Suzanne Dawson and her co-
authors provide a brief overview of the other three variations: 
(iii) Back-end provisions entitling stockholders, except Acquiring Persons, to 
receive stock and/or debt of the issuer and/or cash generally valued (together with 
stock retained by the issuer’s stockholders, if not required to be tendered to the 
issuer) at a premium over market for the issuer’s stock. 
(iv) Convertible preferred stock provisions entitling stockholders, except 
Acquiring Persons, to voting stock in the Acquiring Person as part of any 
business combination and to redeem their preferred stock for cash payments from 
the issuer if there is no business combination. 
(v) Voting provisions involving the issuance of stock with supervoting rights not 
available to an Acquiring Person. 
Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 424. For an in-depth discussion of all five variations, see generally 
Thompson, supra note 20, at 181–87. 
 26. E.g., Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 428; FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.01 
[B][1] (“Today, the prevalent version of the pill . . . is the standard ‘flip-in/flip-over’ stockholder rights 
plan.”). Typically, after an acquirer accumulates the specified percentage of stock, every other 
shareholder is entitled to purchase additional voting stock at 50 percent of its market price. Id. 
 27. Harsh, supra note 18, at 668. 
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purchase the acquirer’s stock at a substantial discount—typically at 
50%.28 Flip-over provisions can significantly diminish an acquirer’s 
capital assets because of this discount.29 
In effect, flip-in and flip-over provisions serve as formidable 
deterrents.30 Indeed, when either provision is triggered, “shareholders 
will find that the rights are valuable and exercise them.”31 As a result, 
the acquisition becomes exponentially more costly. 32  Therefore, 
bidders are greatly discouraged from “accumulating the trigger level 
through purchase, tender, or the formation of formal voting 
agreements with other shareholders.”33 
2.   Overcoming Poison Pills 
The only way around a poison pill is to have it removed, and most 
are retractable.34 With this in mind, there are three recognized ways 
to remove a poison pill: (1) negotiate with the target company to 
retract the pill,35 (2) appeal to the court by asserting that company 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 427. Dawson and her colleagues offer a helpful illustration: 
[A]ssuming an exercise price of $150, the standard . . . flip-over poison pill plan 
would require that, in order for the issuer to consummate a merger into an 
Acquiring Person, the merger agreement must provide that the rights holders can 
purchase $300 worth of the Acquiring Person’s common stock for $150. 
Id. 
 29. Thomas, supra note 2, at 512. 
 30. It is important to note that these two provisions are commonly used in conjunction; after a flip-in 
provision event, if the company engages in any merger negotiations or a substantial sale of its assets, a 
flip-over provision will trigger and allow every stockholder except the acquirer to purchase “the most 
senior voting securities” at fifty percent of market price. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at 
§ 5.01 [B][1]. Of course, the flip-in provision is generally so effective that the flip-over is superfluous. 
Id. (observing that a flip-in provision’s effects have become so unacceptable to hostile bidders that only 
one has ever been triggered). 
 31. Thomas, supra note 2, at 512; accord Velasco, supra note 4, at 394, n.88 (observing that “once 
the rights become exercisable, it becomes irrational to refuse to exercise them, since a shareholder 
would be subjecting herself to the same economic poison facing the hostile acquiror”). 
 32. Thomas, supra note 2, at 512. 
 33. Harsh, supra note 18, at 668; accord Velasco, supra note 4, at 383 (“The poison pill derives its 
effectiveness from this deterrence value—the incumbent management can remain in power because the 
hostile bidder cannot afford to trigger the poison pill.”). 
 34. E.g., Shearer, supra note 2, at 812. Removing a poison pill is technically known as redemption. 
Id. “Once the pill is redeemed, the rights can no longer affect the stock because they are no longer 
exercisable.” Id. Also, it is important to note that rights plans are only redeemable by the board of 
directors. Id. 
 35. Velasco, supra note 4, at 383. “[T]his is little more than a phantom option; if a friendly 
transaction were feasible, a hostile bid would not have been necessary.” Id. To be sure, copacetic 
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leadership has breached its fiduciary duty,36 or (3) wage a proxy 
contest to displace the incumbent board so that new directors may 
remove the pill.37 A proxy contest, however, is generally “the only 
real option available to most hostile bidders” and warrants further 
discussion.38 
A proxy contest is a fight for control of a company. More 
specifically, it is a direct appeal to voting shareholders governed by 
SEC regulations.39 The purpose of the proxy contest is to provide 
shareholders with enough information about the dissident investors 
and surrounding context so that they can vote for leadership that best 
represents the company’s interests.40 Despite their popularity in the 
1950s and 1960s, however, proxy contests became sparse moving 
into the final quarter of the twentieth century.41 Then, beginning in 
the early 1990s in response to the growing number of companies that 
adopted antitakeover provisions, proxy contests reemerged as a tool 
for activist shareholders eager to remove unwanted executives.42 As a 
result, corporate executives scrambled for a way to defend their 
positions. 
                                                                                                                 
takeovers are usually cheaper for the purchaser. Id. at 383 n.14. As such, hostile takeovers are only 
pursued where the bidder’s efforts have been hindered or are expected to be. Id. 
 36. Id. at 383; see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 37. Velasco, supra note 4, at 383. 
 38. Id. at 384; Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 432 (identifying an “[i]ncreased likelihood of proxy 
contests” as a potential risk of poison pill implementation). 
 39. Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 
MICH. L. REV. 421, 421 & n.1 (1971). Those rules are codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a. Id. at 421 n.1. 
For an in-depth summary of those rules, as well as the methods of waging a proxy contest, see 
FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 10.02. 
 40. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 421 (describing the purpose of such “corporate combat” as supplying 
shareholders with enough information about each side to make an intelligent decision). 
 41. Thomas, supra note 2, at 508. During that time, the tender offer’s popularity grew, and it 
eclipsed the proxy contest as the preferred method of changing corporate leadership. Id. That is to say, 
due to uncertainty caused by electoral propaganda, shareholders became more willing to sell their shares 
to discordant investors than to show their support at the ballot box. See id. 
 42. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 1, at 405. Indeed, “in 1987, more than 90% of Fortune 500 
firms had antitakeover provisions in their charters.” Id. While poison pills have become widespread, 
however, “[c]orporate America has [also] witnessed an increase in the number of proxy contests and 
consent solicitations in recent years.” FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 10.01 (illustrating this 
statement with empirical charts and data). 
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3.   Dead Hand Provisions 
Though basic poison pills are useful for preventing hostile 
takeovers, historically, when faced with a proxy contest, they did 
little to ensure a company’s board members retained their positions.43 
Thus, boards began adopting continuing director provisions to stay in 
power. 44  These provisions, commonly referred to as “dead hand 
provisions,” restrict the ability to redeem rights under a share plan, 
essentially the poison pill, by only permitting the old board to do so 
and not a new board of directors.45 Therefore, even if a new board 
assumes power, its predecessors can activate the pill, diluting the 
recently acquired holdings and making the displacement infeasible or 
impossible. 46  This gives the board formidable leverage when 
negotiating, often allowing it to fend off proxy fights.47 Indeed, dead 
hand provisions have evolved into powerful and controversial 
weapons, becoming perhaps the only “absolute ‘show stoppers’ in the 
takeover market.”48 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.02 [B] (explaining that, because standard 
poison pills do not bar a proxy contest, the acquiror can obtain control of the board and exercise its 
redemption power). It should be noted, however, that basic poison pill varieties can be useful leverage 
for an incumbent board in the negotiations preceding a proxy contest. See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 
No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (noting that where a target 
company anticipated a proxy contest, executive advisors described poison pills as “[e]ffective device[s] 
to ensure Board involvement in the timing and outcome of a takeover bid or creeping accumulation of 
control”) (second alteration added). Because proxy contests are time-consuming and expensive, 
dissident shareholders inhibited from hostile acquisition by a rights plan, may be more willing to 
negotiate a deal before the contest date. Id. at 9–10, 14; Velasco, supra note 4, at 384. 
 44. Harsh, supra note 18, at 673–74. 
 45. Id. Delayed redemption provisions, also known as “no hand provisions,” work in essentially the 
same way, the only difference being that new board members are prohibited from affecting rights plans 
for a set term, during which time the original board is free to exercise the rights. Shearer, supra note 2, 
at 811. 
 46. Shearer, supra note 2, at 816 (describing how a dead hand provision would prevent a newly 
formed board from exercising the redemption right). 
 47. Thomas, supra note 2, at 508; see also Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 
1283, 1289–90 (Del. 1998) (illustrating how a continuing director feature can thwart a tender offer and 
proxy contest, leaving legal remedies as the only available option for a hostile bidder). 
 48. Harsh, supra note 18, at 675; cf. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.02 (advocating 
that while poison pills may be deterrents, they are not a target corporation’s panacea). 
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B.   The Development of Poison Pills in the Law 
The poison pill has played a dynamic role in the progression of 
corporate takeover jurisprudence “[s]ince making its legal debut in 
1985 . . . .”49 During that year, the poison pill made an appearance in 
two Delaware cases: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 50  and 
Moran v. Household International, Inc.51 In Unocal, the Delaware 
Supreme Court addressed whether boards of directors faced with 
takeover threats should be protected under the business judgment rule 
by introducing a standard of review.52 Specifically, the court laid out 
what became a two-prong test: (1) “a reasonableness test, which is 
satisfied by a demonstration that the board of directors had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy 
and effectiveness existed,”53 and (2) a “proportionality test, which is 
satisfied by a demonstration that the board of directors’ defensive 
response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”54 If the court 
is convinced both prongs are satisfied, the business judgment rule 
applies, and the court will presume the board’s actions are valid. 
Five months after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court went 
further and validated poison pills as “legitimate exercise[s] of 
business judgment.”55 In Moran v. Household International, Inc., the 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 27 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d 
sub nom. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
 50. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985). 
 51. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 52. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953. In Unocal, the board of directors rejected Mesa’s tender offer for 
sixty-four million shares at forty percent below market price. Id. at 949–50. In sum, the court concluded 
that Unocal’s board was faced with a “threat it reasonably perceived to be harmful to the corporate 
enterprise,” so “its action [was] entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule[.]” Id. at 953, 
958. 
 53. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 
2, 2014). This prong “is essentially a process-based review” that can be satisfied “by demonstrating 
[both] good faith and reasonable investigation.” Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 
92 (Del. Ch. 2011); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990); see 
also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 54. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *16. This prong consists of its own two-part test: First, were 
the board’s defensive measures “draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive[?]” Unitrin, Inc. v. 
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). If the court answers no, it must then determine 
whether the actions taken were “within a range of reasonable responses to the threat.” Id. Also, it is 
important to note that the board of directors bears the burden of proof during both prongs of the Unocal 
standard. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 55. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348. 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss3/5
2016] LOCKING THE BOARDROOM DOOR 735 
court upheld a rights plan that contained a flip-over provision 
triggered after either the announcement of a tender offer for 30% of 
corporate shares or in response to an individual entity or group 
acquiring 20% of corporate shares. 56  Two disgruntled investors 
attempted to abrogate the plan, alleging abuse of discretion.57 The 
court, however, concluded that the board had acted within its 
fiduciary authority when adopting the plan even though the board 
enacted the pill absent an immediate threat.58 The court also found 
“the inherent powers of the Board conferred by 8 Del.C. § 141(a), 
concerning the management of the corporation’s ‘business and 
affairs’[,] . . . provid[ed] the Board additional authority upon which 
to enact the Rights Plan.” 59  Moreover, in applying the Unocal 
standard, the court determined that the board’s decision benefited 
from the business judgment rule.60 
The Delaware Supreme Court has stood firmly behind its earlier 
decisions, repeatedly affirming the Moran holding and reiterating 
that instituting poison pills is a legitimate exercise of a board’s 
discretionary power. 61  However, Delaware courts have refused to 
validate several directorial responses to threats of proxy contests,62 
including dead hand and no hand provisions, which confine the 
authority to retract the poison pill to the incumbent board members.63 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1349. 
 58. Id. at 1350, 1353. 
 59. Id. at 1353. 
 60. Id. at 1357. 
 61. See, e.g., Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d 245, 250–51 (Del. 2001). In that case, “[t]he 
court recognized that many of the claims were not ‘precisely controlled by stare decisis,’ but reasoned 
that ‘[t]o recognize [the] validity of . . . [such] claim[s] would emasculate the basic holding of Moran, 
both as to this case and in futuro, that directors of a Delaware corporation may adopt a rights plan 
unilaterally.’” Velasco, supra note 4, at 395 (citing Account, 780 A.2d at 249). See also Unitrin, Inc. v. 
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1391 (Del. 1995); Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 
1153 (Del. 1990) (explicitly rejecting “a narrow and rigid construction of Unocal”); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (upholding a back-end 
provision). 
 62. See, e.g., Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1998). For example, the 
Chancery held that directors cannot delay shareholder meetings to buy more time to solicit votes nor 
increase the board’s size to preserve control because such actions are not in the stockholders’ interests. 
Id. at 1186; Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1208 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
 63. See generally Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); see also 
Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1186 (striking down a dead hand poison pill). For a more detailed discussion of 
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Notably, in Quick Turn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 64  the 
Delaware Supreme Court quashed a delayed redemption provision 
that prohibited new directors from redeeming plan rights for six 
months.65 While the Chancery found that the provision failed under 
the Unocal test as an unreasonable response to a perceived threat,66 
even more significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the 
provision was against fundamental tenants of corporate law.67 
1.   Poison Pills in Georgia 
Less than a year before Delaware’s judiciary invalidated dead hand 
and no hand provisions, the Northern District of Georgia ruled in 
favor of such defense mechanisms in 1997.68 In Invacare Corp. v. 
Healthdyne Technologies, Inc., 69  Invacare sought a preliminary 
injunction to nullify Healthdyne’s shareholder rights plan. 70  In 
addition, Invacare proposed a bylaw that, if adopted, would compel 
Healthdyne’s board to rescind the plan’s continuing director 
provision. 71  However, the court upheld the continuing director 
                                                                                                                 
dead hand and no hand poison pills, see supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
 64. Quickturn Design, 721 A.2d at 1281. 
 65. Id. at 1287; see also discussion supra note 43. 
 66. Quickturn Design, 721 A.2d at 1290. 
 67. Id. at 1291–92. 
One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of 
directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a 
corporation. Section 141(a) requires that any limitation on the board’s authority 
be set out in the certificate of incorporation. The Quickturn certificate of 
incorporation contains no provision purporting to limit the authority of the board 
in any way. The Delayed Redemption Provision, however, would prevent a newly 
elected board of directors from completely discharging its fundamental 
management duties to the corporation and its stockholders for six months . . . . 
[Indeed, the provision] restricts the board’s power in an area of fundamental 
importance to the shareholders—negotiating a possible sale of the corporation. 
Id. 
 68. See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1579. The provision “require[d] that any redemption or amendment of the rights plan be 
approved by one or more directors who were members of the Board prior to the adoption of the rights 
plan, or who were subsequently elected to the Board with the recommendation and approval of the other 
continuing directors.” Id. Thus, “if Healthdyne’s shareholders vote[d] . . . to replace the incumbent 
directors with Invacare’s slate of directors, the new Board of Directors could not redeem the rights plan 
because they would not be ‘continuing directors.’” Id. 
 71. Id. 
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feature and found that the proposed bylaw violated Georgia corporate 
law because it “would infringe upon the board’s [sole] discretion,” 
which is statutorily prescribed and broad enough to encompass “the 
authority to include [] continuing directors provisions . . . .”72 In fact, 
the court lauded dead hand provisions, declaring that “the concept of 
continuing directors is an integral part of a takeover defense and is 
not contrary to public policy in Georgia.”73 
In the wake of Delaware’s Quick Turn opinion, critics questioned 
the Northern District’s decision to bestow upon directors such broad 
discretion in adopting dead hand and no hand provisions.74 Yet, in 
2000, Georgia amended its share options statute not to follow 
Delaware but to cement its own approach to rights plans.75 Indeed, 
O.C.G.A. § 12-2-624, “contrary to the Delaware authority, permit[s] 
limitations on the ability of newly elected directors to withdraw or 
change [shareholder] plan[s][;]”76 albeit now, such limitations may 
only remain in effect for 180 days from a director’s election.77 
II.   A MODERN POISON PILL EVOLUTION 
More recently, poison pills have reemerged as a focal point of 
debate following the decision in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht 78 
where Delaware’s Court of Chancery upheld a new poison pill 
variation that specifically discriminates against activist investors.79 
The decision is a hallmark in Delaware jurisprudence that will 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 1582 (referencing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624(c), which “gives the directors of Georgia 
corporations the sole discretion to determine the terms and conditions of a shareholders rights plan”). 
 73. Id. at 1581. To support its conclusion that dead hand provisions are consistent with Georgia 
public policy, the court also leaned on the use of “continuing directors” in two other state statutes. Id. at 
1580–81 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1111, 14-2-1133 (1994)). 
 74. See, e.g., Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision, supra note 1, at 1631 (“At a 
minimum, given the de facto interference with the shareholder franchise posed by continuing director 
provisions and the Georgia legislature’s express desire to conform to Delaware law, the court should 
have applied Delaware’s Blasius standard and required Healthdyne to show a ‘compelling justification’ 
for its infringement upon shareholder voting rights.”); Harsh, supra note 18, at 685–86. 
 75. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 
2014). 
 79. Id. at *26–27; see also description of the poison pill infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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undoubtedly trickle down from the corporate hub and have far-
reaching effects on American corporate law.80 
A.   The Facts of Third Point 
In the fall of 2013, Sotheby’s81 realized that Third Point LLC,82 
working with two other activist hedge funds, had acquired 
approximately nineteen percent of its outstanding stock.83 Sotheby’s 
anticipated that the investors intended to replace members of its 
board with their own representatives.84 Therefore, to gain leverage 
before an inevitable proxy contest, Sotheby’s board adopted a 
discriminatory rights plan.85 The poison pill had a relatively new, 
                                                                                                                 
 80. It is well known that states often look to Delaware when dealing with matters of corporate law. 
Historically, this convention of imitation has steered many states’ assessment of poison pills. Velasco, 
supra note 4, at 400. As a result, many pills have been upheld through reasoning that mimics Moran and 
Unocal. See, e.g., Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845, 849–50 (D. Minn. 1986), 
aff’d in part and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying the two-part Unocal test to 
determine that the board’s decision to keep a rights plan in place “was clearly a reasonable response to 
the hostile bid, which the Board . . . concluded was inadequate from a financial point of view”); A. 
Copeland Enters., Inc. v. Guste, 706 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (“The validity of the poison 
pill . . . can be viewed in two contexts: its validity at the time of adoption and its continued validity in 
light of events subsequent to adoption.”). Moreover, several state legislatures have even codified 
Delaware’s common law validation, authorizing the use of poison pills in their statutory scheme. See 
FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.06 [B][2] (listing thirty-four state statutes authorizing 
boards of directors to use poison pills). 
 81. Sotheby’s is the “oldest auction house in the world” and is a Delaware corporation publicly 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *2. In particular, 
Sotheby’s specializes in selling fine art. Id. at *3. 
 82. Third Point LLC is an activist hedge fund firm managing roughly $14.5 billion in assets and is 
known for reshaping the “business policies or capital structure of the companies it invests in.” Id. at *2. 
 83. Id. at *9. When the case was heard, Third Point controlled 9.62 percent of outstanding shares 
while the other two acquirers, Trian and Marcato, held about 3 percent and 6.61 percent respectively. Id. 
at *4, *12. Further, “Third Point held derivative positions that, if exercised, would increase [their 
cumulative ownership] to over 20%.” Id. at *7. 
 84. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *7–9. Ruprecht predicted on September 4: 
We are going to be the target of a proxy fight with activist shareholders. The 
motivation for that fight is only peripherally about returning capital. It is about 
being on Sotheby’s Board. . . . 
   . . . . 
 [T]his is about power, and political gamesmanship with shareholders, 
not about capital structure. In the event we do not act, my view is that a proxy 
fight is much harder to win, and a slate of 3–4 new directors would displace 
current directors. 
Id. at *7–8. 
 85. Id. at *8–11. In a press release, the board claimed that the plan was “intended to protect 
Sotheby’s and its shareholders from efforts to obtain control that are inconsistent with the best interests 
of the Company and its shareholders.” Id. at *10. However, Ruprecht believed that the board had always 
12
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two-tiered structure designed to defend against activist 
shareholders.86 Specifically, the plan defined a 10% threshold for all 
stockholder purchases, except for passive investors 87  who could 
acquire up to 20% ownership.88 In addition, the pill contained a one-
year term and “qualifying offer” exception.89 
Over the first quarter of 2014, after Third Point formally 
announced its plan to “run a slate” of three directors at Sotheby’s 
annual meeting, the companies negotiated “earnest[ly] in [an] attempt 
to avoid a proxy contest.”90 Nevertheless, the two failed to reach 
amicable terms.91 Then, when Sotheby’s denied Third Point’s request 
for a waiver from the plan to acquire 20% ownership, Third Point 
and its CEO, Daniel Loeb, filed suit.92 
B.   The Vice Chancellor’s Analysis 
In the context of Third Point’s request for a preliminary injunction, 
the primary issues for the court were (1) whether the rights plan and 
                                                                                                                 
been in Third Point’s “crosshairs,” and in an email he wrote, “[o]ur job is to be compelling with 
investors. We will have a big fight re the board composition next summer. Loeb wants to control our 
board. . . . He’s a scumbag.” Id. at *8, *10. 
 86. Id. at *26–27. 
 87. Passive investors are those whose beneficial ownership is between 5 and 20% of a class of 
outstanding registered securities who have not acquired or held those securities for the purpose or effect 
of changing or influencing control of the issuing company. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015). 
 88. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *10. More specifically, the adopted plan had a two-tier 
structure where “those who report . . . pursuant to Schedule 13G may acquire up to a 20% interest in 
Sotheby’s . . . [while] [a]ll other stockholders, including those who report their ownership pursuant to 
Schedule 13D . . . are limited to a 10% stake in the Company before triggering the . . . ’poison pill.’” Id. 
at *10. It is important to realize, however, that  
“[a] person is eligible to file a Schedule 13G only if, among other things, they 
have ‘not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect of, changing 
or influencing the control of the issuer, or in connection with or as a participant in 
any transaction having that purpose or effect’ and they own less than 20% of the 
issuer’s securities.”  
Id. (citing C.F.R. § 240.12d-1(c)). 
 89. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *10. The pill would automatically expire in one year unless 
prolonged by a stockholder vote. Id. Further, the qualifying offer exception delineated that “the Rights 
Plan [would] not apply to an ‘any-and-all’ shares offer for the Company that cashes out all Sotheby’s 
stockholders and gives them at least 100 days to consider the offer.” Id. 
 90. Id. at *11. 
 91. Id. at *12–13. 
 92. Id. at *13–14. For an account of Mr. Loeb’s experience, as well as an interesting criticism of his 
activist tactics see William D. Cohan, Little Big Man, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2013, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2013/12/dan-loeb-cuba-car-accident. 
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waiver refusal were a disproportionate response to the threat posed 
by Third Point, (2) whether Sotheby’s gained an impermissible 
advantage in the upcoming proxy contest, and (3) whether Sotheby’s 
breached its fiduciary duties in adopting and enforcing the rights 
plan.93 Vice Chancellor Parsons answered all three questions in the 
negative.94 
1.   A Reasonable Reaction—Applying the Unocal Standard 
To assess the board’s actions, the Vice Chancellor utilized the two-
prong Unocal test, ultimately holding that both the poison pill’s 
adoption and subsequent refusal to grant Third Point a waiver were 
reasonable.95 
a.   Adopting the Pill 
Applying the first prong, the Vice Chancellor concluded the board 
likely reached an objectively reasonable determination that Third 
Point’s acquisition of shares was a threat to the company, and, 
accordingly, the rights plan appeared to be reasonable. 96  Indeed, 
relying on the advice of its external advisors, the board surmised that 
three activist investors were attempting to achieve control of the 
company without paying a premium.97 Therefore, the plan’s adoption 
was in response to a legitimate threat of “creeping control.”98 
Applying the second prong, Vice Chancellor Parsons held there 
was adequate probability that the board could demonstrate that 
adopting the poison pill was a reasonable reaction to the “wolf pack” 
threat.99 Specifically, when the board implemented the plan, there 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *14–15. 
 94. Id. at *22–23, *27. 
 95. Id. at *16–17; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955, 957 (Del. 
1985). 
 96. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *17. 
 97. Id. at *18. Sotheby’s advisors were Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz who enlightened the board as to the breadth of Third Point, Trian, and Marcato’s acquisitions, and 
further described a poison pill as an “[e]ffective device to ensure Board involvement in the timing and 
outcome of a takeover bid or creeping accumulation of control.” Id. at *9. 
 98. Id. at *17. 
 99. Id. at *21. 
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was an “objectively reasonable” likelihood that Third Point was 
working with other hedge funds to acquire a control block while 
avoiding a premium.100 Accordingly, failure to implement a poison 
pill or implementing a pill with a trigger greater than 10% would 
make such an acquisition relatively easy for a small group of activist 
investors; therefore, the pill was a proportionate response to the 
threat posed by Third Point.101 
b.   Refusal to Waive the Trigger 
In applying the first prong of the Unocal standard, the court held 
that allowing Third Point to acquire more than 10% ownership 
presented at least one legally cognizable threat: “negative control.”102 
To be sure, if Third Point acquired 20% ownership, it would become 
Sotheby’s largest stockholder by far, exercising effective control 
without a majority position. 103  The Vice Chancellor specifically 
noted that this fact, considered with Mr. Loeb’s “aggressive and 
domineering manner . . . in relation to Sotheby’s, provide[d] an 
adequate basis for [the board’s] legitimate concern that Third Point 
would be able to exercise influence sufficient to control certain 
important corporate actions . . . despite a lack of actual control.”104 
Coupled with this finding, applying the second prong, the court 
quickly decided that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to show a 
reasonable probability the board would be unable to demonstrate that 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at *17. 
 101. Id. at *15, *17. 
 102. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21. Negative control refers to the situation where an investor 
who cannot obtain a majority share, nonetheless acquires enough stock to obtain a “veto right,” whereby 
he can block certain actions that require a substantial vote. Id. 
 103. Id. at *22. Note too, Sotheby’s board collectively only owns 0.87% of the company’s 
outstanding shares. Id. at *3. 
 104. Id. at *21–22; see also Gardner Davis, Keeping Current: Sotheby’s Poison Pill Battle Reshapes 
World of Shareholder Activism, BUS. L. TODAY, June 2014, at 2 (highlighting the importance of 
defendant’s successful portrayal of Loeb in an unfavorable light to the outcome of the case because it 
was critical to the Vice Chancellor’s acceptance of their “rather tenuous argument that ‘effective 
negative control’ was a sufficient threat to justify not waiving the pill”); Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht: 
Practical Implications of Sotheby’s Two-Tiered Poison Pill Having Survived Preliminary Judicial 
Review in Delaware, M&A UPDATE (Hogan Lovells), June 18, 2014, http://ehoganlovells.com/cv/a1903 
d9ea9b819613bc203a0d567c559e4981453 [hereinafter Practical Implications]. 
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its refusal to waive the 10% cap was a reasonable response to the 
threat of negative control.105 
2.   Proxy Contest Motivation 
Vice Chancellor Parsons further concluded that the ensuing proxy 
fight was not the board’s primary motive when adopting the plan.106 
In addition, though Third Point could suffer irreparable harm from 
losing the proxy contest, the poison pill did not tip the scales because 
nothing in the plan forced shareholders to vote for incumbent board 
members.107 In fact, the Vice Chancellor deduced that the election 
was “eminently winnable by either side.”108 
3.   Structure of the Pill 
The Vice Chancellor recognized that Third Point had a valid 
concern in the discriminatory nature of the two-tiered poison pill. 109 
Nonetheless, he concluded that “the importance of the 
‘discriminatory’ nature of the challenged rights plan appear[ed] to be 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *22. Vice Chancellor Parsons further stated, “While it is of 
course conceivable that there is some level of ownership between 10% and 20% that the Board could 
have allowed Third Point to increase its stake . . . without allowing it to obtain negative control, the 10% 
cap must be reasonable, not perfect.” Id. 
 106. Id. at *23–24. The Vice Chancellor reasoned, in part, that obtaining an advantage in the 
upcoming proxy contest could not have been the board’s primary motive because Third Point enjoyed a 
“10–to–1 advantage over the incumbent Board in shareholdings,” and, as a result, maintained a 50% 
chance of winning the upcoming proxy contest, even with the 10% trigger in place. Id. at *23. But see 
Memorandum from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Delaware Court of Chancery Finds 
Sotheby’s Poison Pill Reasonable; Declines to Enjoin Sotheby’s Annual Meeting (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.paulweiss.com/media/2478035/5may14alert.pdf (“Sotheby’s board denied Third Point’s 
request because, among other reasons, the waiver would increase Third Point’s chances of winning the 
proxy contest and allow them to exercise disproportionate control over major corporate decisions (even 
without explicit veto rights).”). 
 107. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *19 (observing that “the Rights Plan does not impose any 
consequences on stockholders for voting their shares as they wish”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at *20. The plaintiffs raised two primary concerns regarding the discriminatory pill: (1) 
allowing boards to chill future activist activity will damage passive investors who “depend on activists 
to pursue value-enhancing initiatives, including proxy fights, which often serve the long-term interests 
of stockholders,” and (2) “stockholders should be treated equally.” Id. at *26. However, despite 
acknowledging that the court is “generally sympathetic” to such policy concerns, Vice Chancellor 
Parsons refused to consider such repercussions before a final hearing on the merits because “they do not 
present imminent threats . . . [but], instead, speak to the long-term reasonableness of the Rights 
Plan . . . .” Id. 
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overstated . . . .”110 Indeed, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument 
that such a plan’s divergent treatment of activist investors was 
inherently wrongful; however, the Vice Chancellor was careful not to 
endorse the pill’s two-tier structure.111 
C.   Implications 
1.   Two-Tiered Discriminatory Plans 
Though the Vice Chancellor deliberately withheld approval of 
two-tiered poison pills, his decision certifies that they are not per se 
invalid. 112  Moreover, the court’s reasoning conveys that pills 
deliberately targeting activist investors are not unreasonable under 
the Unocal standard.113 Indeed, such plans may even be a “closer fit” 
than “garden variety” plans in the face of a hostile acquisition.114 In 
addition, the court noted that a pill having a threshold of more than 
10% would have been essentially ineffective.115 As such, poison pills 
with lower triggers than traditional rights plans are not just 
reasonable but often necessary.116 
2.   Effective Negative Control 
Even where there is no threat of majority acquisition, a board may 
be able to successfully defend poison pill implementation based on 
the concept of effective negative control. 117  Though Sotheby’s 
refusal to grant Third Point a waiver may not have ordinarily held up 
under the first prong of the Unocal test,118 considering Mr. Loeb’s 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. at *20. 
 111. Id. at *26. See Chris O’Leary, Heading Into a Hot Summer, THE M&A LAW., June 2014, at 3 
(“[T]he decision isn’t ‘a blanket endorsement of a board’s decision to impose a two-trigger rights plan 
that “discriminates” against activists or a board’s decision not to redeem or waive a two-trigger 
pill . . . .’”). 
 112. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
 113. See Practical Implications, supra note 104. 
 114. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *20. 
 115. Id. at *21. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See Practical Implications, supra note 104. 
 118. See id. 
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aggressive past conduct, the court concluded that the threat of 
negative control was legitimate. 119  Thus, a poison pill may be 
reasonable where an investor acquires an influential portion of 
company stock and threatens to exercise disproportionate leverage 
over major corporate decision-making without paying a premium.120 
3.   Motivation Matters 
Delaware jurisprudence has repeatedly invalidated pills 
implemented for the primary purpose of winning a proxy fight or 
maintaining boardroom incumbency.121 It is obvious that Sotheby’s 
adopted its plan largely in preparation for a proxy contest. 122 
Nonetheless, the court concluded the upcoming election was not the 
dominant motive behind the pill.123 Therefore, if a board appears to 
have concentrated its efforts on preventing a change in control 
without paying a premium, it can likely implement a defensive pill 
that simultaneously protects members’ incumbency.124 
D.   What Would Georgia Do? 
Like most states, Georgia’s poison pill jurisprudence largely 
conforms to Delaware corporate law.125 In fact, Georgia has codified 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See Davis, supra note 104, at 2. 
 120. See Practical Implications, supra note 104. 
 121. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1282 (Del. 1998); Unitrin, Inc., 
v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) (reiterating “concern about defensive actions 
designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising shareholders”). 
 122. See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *7–9 (Del. Ch. 
May 2, 2014) (describing internal communications where board members predicted a shareholder vote 
and Third Point’s ambition to infiltrate the board and, further discussed tactics for handling the threat). 
 123. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 124. Sotheby’s also greatly benefited its position by offering to allow one or two Third Point 
representatives onto its board during pre-trial negotiations. Davis, supra note 104, at 2; Third Point, 
2014 WL 1922029, at *11–12 (describing the negotiations). However, the brunt of those negotiations 
occurred months after the board adopted the pill. Id. 
 125. In 1988, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held in West Point-
Pepperell v. Farley, Inc. that certain forms of discriminatory poison pills were invalid under the Georgia 
code. W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (N.D. Ga. 1988). This decision 
made Georgia’s poison pill law inconsistent with Delaware jurisprudence. See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, 
supra note 16, at § 5.06 [B][1]. The very next year, however, the legislature rejected West Point-
Pepperell and resolved this inconstancy. See id. at § 5.06 [B][2] (referencing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624’s 
1989 amendment). 
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Delaware’s validation of discriminatory pills. 126  Nevertheless, in 
Invacare, a Georgia federal court veered away from Delaware law 
and the Georgia legislature further solidified that divergence with an 
amendment to § 14-2-624. 127  However, in doing so, Georgia law 
legitimized a poison pill variety that even Delaware’s Court of 
Chancery refused to endorse.128  By upholding continuing director 
provisions, Georgia has significantly hindered a discontent 
shareholder’s right to settle their grievances through corporate 
democracy. 129  Such executive empowerment at the risk of 
“disenfranchising shareholders” extends beyond the shield of 
Delaware’s business judgment rule. 130  Indeed, there is now a 
precedent in Georgia that a board of directors has “sole discretion” in 
selecting the terms of a rights plan—a deference that may preempt 
fundamental corporate standards.131 
Georgia has thus established a poison pill law that is more 
amicable to vulnerable boards.132 As such, in applying that law to the 
facts of Third Point, a Georgia court would undoubtedly reach the 
same conclusion as Vice Chancellor Parsons. Specifically, the court 
would likely hold that both the two-tiered pill and waiver refusal 
were reasonable reactions to the activist threat and consistent with 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014); FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.06 [B][1]. 
 127. See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1997); 
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014). 
 128. Compare Invacare Corp., 968 F. Supp. at 1581 (validating continuing director provisions), with 
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1283 (Del. 1998) (striking down delayed 
redemption provision), and Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1998) (striking 
down dead hand pill). 
 129. See Harsh, supra note 18, at 685 (“[C]ontinuing director provision[s] may have effectively 
eliminated shareholders’ ability to take their grievances to the ballot box . . . [because] shareholders 
remain free to vote in a new board, but that new board lacks the power to redeem the rights plan.”); 
accord Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision, supra note 1, at 1631 (asserting that “such 
provisions effectively render the election of a new board meaningless”). 
 130. Unitrin, Inc., v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995); see also Velasco, supra note 
4, at 397 (discussing the significance of proxy contests in Delaware decisions since Moran). 
 131. Invacare Corp., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1582. The Invacare court found the board’s “sole discretion” 
took “precedence over section 801(b)’s requirement that all limitations on the board’s power be set forth 
in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws . . . .” Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision, 
supra note 1, at 1629. However, the legislature deleted the statute’s “sole discretion” language in 2000 
so the text “must be read in a manner consistent with other provisions of the Code.” O.C.G.A. § 14-2-
624 (2014). 
 132. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014). 
19
Long: Locking the Boardroom Door
Published by Reading Room, 2016
746 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
Georgia law. 133  However, such analysis is likely inconsequential 
because the anxious board would have likely adopted a continuing 
directors provision if Sotheby’s was incorporated in Georgia, 
rendering any proxy contest trivial (at least for 180 days). 
III.   KEYS TO LOCKING THE BOARDROOM 
While poison pills can be useful armaments to a pressured board, 
allowing them to gain some leverage against hostile activism and 
intercede in a way that serves the best interest of shareholders, poison 
pills may impair a business’s growth and serve as an unnecessary 
shield for executive incumbency.134 Therefore, while discriminatory 
rights plans are legitimate when facilitating a fiduciary duty, recent 
corporate law has extended “director primacy”135 too far. Indeed, the 
Vice Chancellor’s reasoning in Third Point could make it easier for 
incompetent board members to secure their incumbency. 136 
Furthermore, Third Point involved the legality of a poison pill 
variation that has never before been challenged. 137  Such blatant 
discriminatory rights plans contradict grounded principles of 
corporate law, raise significant policy concerns, and should never be 
validated under judicial review. Therefore, courts, shareholders, and 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Because of Georgia’s share options statute, the court would not have to apply the Unocal 
standard. See generally Invacare Corp., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (no mention of Unocal). Rather, the court 
would look to the Georgia Code: section 624(d)(1) authorizes poison pills affecting “beneficial 
owner[s]” as defined in section 14-2-1110. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-624(d)(1) (2014), 14-2-1110(4) (2010). 
Further, section 624(e)(1) permits “any exclusion from such definition . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624(e)(1) 
(2014). Therefore, the Code allows flexibility in determining at whom the poison pill is directed. Id.; see 
also O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624(a) (2014) (empowering the board of directors to choose plan terms including 
any “conditions precedent”). So, it appears that a pill treating stockholder classes differently would not 
be inconsistent with the statutory language. 
 134. Francis J. Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Keeping Current: Poison Pills Find New Life as “Raider-
Like” Activism is on the Rise, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2014, at 1 (“[P]oison pills [] serve to provide the 
target company’s board of directors with the time required to fulfill their fiduciary duties and properly 
respond to ‘raider-like’ activists.”). 
 135. A term coined by Stephen M. Bainbridge in Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: 
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2002). Alexandros Seretakis, Hostile Takeovers 
and Defensive Mechanisms in the United Kingdom and the United States: A Case Against the United 
States Regime, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 245, 275 (2013). 
 136. See generally Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. 
Ch. May 2, 2014). 
 137. See discussion supra Part II. 
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state legislatures should take appropriate action to avert Delaware’s 
dangerous jurisprudence. 
A.   A Toxic Precedent 
A fundamental pillar of corporate law is a board’s accountability to 
its shareholders. This is exemplified in dissident shareholders’ 
abilities to replace directors whose performance they find 
unsatisfactory.138 In fact, the validation of defensive tactics, including 
poison pills, was premised on the assumption that shareholders who 
are dissatisfied with a board’s decision to block activist offers will 
replace those directors with a team willing to take different action.139 
Nevertheless, the Third Point decision threatens to entrench 
incumbent boards and serve as a blueprint for directors to validate 
questionable (perhaps even negligible) decisions. 
Corporate law is governed by the precept that shareholders, as 
owners of the business, should be entitled to make their own 
investment decisions, as well as any decisions concerning the 
reallocation of corporate power. 140  As such, when a board of 
directors adopts a measure “calculated to alter the structure of the 
corporation, removing decisions in takeover matters from individual 
stockholders and reposing them in the Board,” it has offended the 
very spirit of corporate law.141 Nevertheless, the court in Third Point 
found a poison pill reasonable when facing the possibility of negative 
or creeping control. 142  This undermines the core competency of 
corporate democracy in favor of a governance model that empowers 
board members to position themselves as owners of the business. 
                                                                                                                 
 138. The power to replace board members is the primary check on directorial decision-making. 
Indeed, corporate law insulates directors’ judgment from judicial scrutiny on the basis that those 
decisions are monitored by shareholders who will hold their directors accountable. See, e.g., In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that “redress for [board] 
failures . . . must come . . . through the action of shareholders . . . and not from this Court”). 
 139. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the stockholders 
are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at 
their disposal to turn the board out.”). 
 140. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 195 (3d ed. 1983); infra note 149. 
 141. Asarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D.N.J. 1985). 
 142. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 
2, 2014); see also supra Part II.C.2. 
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Because negative and creeping control become “threats” at a very 
low percentage of ownership,143 a board can justify adopting a rights 
plan against any activist investor. Therefore, directors can deter any 
investment they do not approve. Yet, these are not the “raider-like” 
activists the poison pill was designed to combat144—they are not 
primarily concerned with acquiring the company at a price 
detrimental to stockholders; rather, they are focused on ensuring that 
the company runs in the most profitable manner possible in order to 
yield a return on their investments.145 
B.   The Invalidity of Two-tiered Pills146 
Two-tiered rights plans, such as the one utilized in Third Point, 
blatantly discriminate against shares of the same class and series. 
This is particularly troubling because most states’ corporation laws 
forbid, either expressly or implicitly, such discrimination. 147 
Although Vice Chancellor Parsons reasoned that the prejudicial 
structure of such pills weighs on their long-term reasonableness,148 to 
the contrary, such rights plans should be deemed ultra vires. 
                                                                                                                 
 143. An acquiror could potentially gain a veto right with less than ten percent of the outstanding 
stock. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 144. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor 
Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4–16 (2002) (describing the “historical context of the [antitakeover] 
debate”); FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.04 [A] (describing the hostile 1980s activist 
environment in which the poison pill was created). 
 145. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2013); Kuang-Wei Chueh, Is Hedge Fund Activism New Hope for the 
Market?, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 724, 729–32 (2008) (describing the role of activist investors in 
corporate governance or corporate control). 
 146. Remember that Vice Chancellor Parsons straddled the fault line of whether such poison pills 
were valid, careful not to condone Sotheby’s adopting such a pill. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at 
*26–27; see also supra Part II.C.2. Therefore, outside the context of a preliminary injunction, 
discriminatory rights plans may still be found invalid, not just in other states, but by the Delaware Court 
of Chancery. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *26–27. 
 147. Velasco, supra note 4, at 403 n.153 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 6.01–.02 (1999)); accord 
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-602 (2014) (“[A]ll shares of a class or, if applicable, series within a class must have 
preferences, limitations, and relative rights identical with those of other shares of the same class or 
series . . . .”). Note, too, that although Delaware’s corporate statutes do not have such an express 
provision, this concept has been adopted through the state’s common law. See In re Sea-Land Corp. 
S’holder Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 799–800 n.10 (Del. Ch. 1993) (citing cases that demonstrate it has 
historically been recognized that “absent an express agreement or statute to the contrary, all shares of 
stock are equal”). 
 148. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *20. 
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1.   An Argument Against Shareholder Discrimination 
Most courts that have struck down poison pills have done so on the 
basis of discrimination.149 Specifically, because a typical rights plan 
allows common shareholders to exercise or transfer a particular right 
upon the occurrence of a triggering event while prohibiting the 
acquirer from doing the same, those courts have found poison pills 
unlawful or unwarranted. 150  Similarly, two-tiered rights plans 
discriminatorily dilute an “acquiror’s interests, voting rights, and 
equity . . . .” 151  Moreover, two-tiered poison pills base such 
discrimination on the type of schedule filed. Therefore, stock from 
the exact same class will produce different voting capacity depending 
on whether the purchaser filed a schedule 13D (which activist 
investors must file) or 13G (which only passive investors may 
file).152 For this reason, two-tiered plans brazenly contradict Moran 
where the court premised its decision on the notion that poison pills 
would only have a “minimal” effect on proxy contests.153 
In sum, two-tiered rights plans, when exercised, create a drastic 
change in a corporation’s control structure. They reallocate equity 
interests and disrupt the voting power among shareholders of the 
same class. Restructuring of this magnitude cannot be done without 
an amendment to the corporate charter.154 Therefore, two-tier poison 
pills exceed the power granted to a board of directors. 
                                                                                                                 
 149. E.g., W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (N.D. Ga. 1988); 
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc. 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (flip-in 
provision’s discriminatory features violated corporate law); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 
F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding a pill’s non-transferability constraint illegally 
discriminated among shareholders). 
 150. See cases cited supra note 149. 
 151. Thompson, supra note 20, at 195. Like other poison pills, when a triggering event occurs under a 
two-tier plan, the rights of the acquiror become non-exercisable and non-transferable. Id. 
 152. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015) (setting forth the requirements for filing schedules 13D and 
13G). 
 153. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985). 
 154. Corporate charters list the rights of shareholders. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) 
(2006). 
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2.   Policy Concerns 
Many academics and capitalists opine that hostile takeovers are an 
essential mechanism for safeguarding the efficiency of corporate 
governance.155 Indeed, hedge funds and private equity funds often 
pursue control in a company because they have innovative ideas on 
how to realize that company’s value.156  Effectively implementing 
those changes, however, often requires the ousting of under-
performing directors. Nevertheless, armed with a pill that directly 
limits the ownership of such investors, single-minded directors can 
obtain considerable leverage and not only frustrate the 
implementation of these beneficial changes but also ensure their 
incumbency by creating an obvious advantage in a proxy contest or 
even deterring a proxy challenge altogether.157 Moreover, because 
two-tiered pills allow passive investors to purchase up to 20% of the 
company’s outstanding shares, a shareholder that has filed a schedule 
13G can disproportionately affect the company’s future.158 Indeed, 
the Delaware Court of Chancery suggested in Third Point that 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 145; Chueh, supra note 144; Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen 
Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2001). 
 156. Though a common concern with activist investors is the assumption that they over-emphasize 
short-term returns at the expense of long-term growth, this concern is largely exaggerated. Bebchuk, 
supra note 145, at 1639. On the contrary, there are ample incentives for activists to pursue strategies that 
will benefit both the long and short terms. Id. at 1643. Therefore, even if activists produce some long-
term costs, the benefits of those actions may well exceed any deficiencies. Id. at 1664–65. So, this 
dichotomy necessarily raises the question of activists’ motivation: are they concerned with private 
benefits or earning a return on their investment? If it is the latter, an activist takeover may benefit the 
company and yield a financial benefit to shareholders. Chueh, supra note 144, at 754–58. 
 157. Proxy challenges are extremely expensive. See generally Daniel M. Friedman, Expenses of 
Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 951 (1951). Therefore, where an investor’s ownership is 
limited, the cost of taking control may become too high in light of the increased risk of losing. 
 158. In particular, schedule 13G’s passivity requirement is self-proclaimed, and the decision to switch 
from schedule 13G to 13D is largely a subjective one; as a consequence, an investor who secretly holds 
activist intentions may be able “to improperly file a Schedule 13G while quietly planning (or even 
discretely acting on) its activist intentions.” Kristin Giglia, Note, A Little Letter, A Big Difference: An 
Empirical Inquiry into Possible Misuse of Schedule 13g/13d Filings, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 105, 117 
(2016). Moreover, “nothing in the rules or statute explicitly precludes Schedule 13G filers from 
exercising their voice when it comes to voting on corporate matters.” Id. at 118. Indeed, the only formal 
restrictions on corporate voting “apply through the ten-day safe-harbor provision, which triggers only 
when a 13G filer switches to 13D filing (either by choice or by surpassing the twenty percent 
threshold).” Id. at 118 n.74 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(e)-(f) (2015)). 
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investors who had filed schedule 13Gs could vote in a proxy contest 
without forfeiting their passive status.159 
C.   Preventing the Transmission of a Toxic Precedent 
As discussed in the preceding sections, Third Point, if applied 
loosely, could create a precedent that entrenches boards at the 
expense of corporate democracy and legitimizes a poison pill that is 
beyond the traditional power vested in directors. However, courts, 
states, and shareholders can mitigate such negative repercussions, 
particularly in states such as Georgia that have become rooted in a 
practice of boardroom protectionism. 
1.   Courts 
Though Vice Chancellor Parsons decided Third Point under the 
Unocal test, considering the circumstances, he could have utilized the 
more exacting Blasius standard.160 “Blasius held that the board of 
directors must provide a ‘compelling justification’ for its actions 
where the board act[s] ‘for the primary purpose of interfering with 
the effectiveness of a stockholder vote.’”161 Indeed, because adopting 
a two-tiered pill will inhibit an acquirer’s voting rights by capping its 
ownership of voting shares, Georgia could review such pills under 
the Blasius standard. In fact, Blasius may even be more appropriate 
considering the discriminatory nature of two-tiered plans, especially 
if adopted in anticipation of a proxy contest. Even so, Blasius would 
not be dispositive. However, it would place a more exacting burden 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *20 n.37 (Del. Ch. 
May 2, 2014) (“Based on the evidence presented here, there do not appear to be any restrictions 
whatsoever on a Schedule 13G filer who wishes to vote for a dissident slate in a proxy contest. Said 
differently, there is no evidence that a Schedule 13G filer would have to file a Schedule 13D or would 
otherwise ‘trigger’ the Rights Plan simply because they decide to vote for directors other than those 
endorsed by the Company.”). 
 160. Despite the plaintiffs’ urging, Vice Chancellor Parsons determined that Unocal, not Blasius, was 
the proper standard of review. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *15. However, the Vice Chancellor 
was sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ argument in theory and even noted the slight possibility that Blasius 
could be implicated within the Unocal framework. Id. 
 161. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 330 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting Blasius 
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)). 
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on directors to justify their actions, thereby encouraging legitimate 
use of defensive measures and safeguarding shareholder franchise. 
2.   States 
An indulgent approach to takeover measures, such as Georgia’s, is 
logical: 
Because managers have authority over reincorporation 
decisions, a state, in order to attract more companies 
through reincorporations from other states, or alternatively 
prevent a flight of companies to other states, will adopt a 
lenient stance towards management takeover rules. 
Therefore, states have incentives to provide rules that 
shield the management from hostile takeovers.162 
Still, states must be careful not to protect corporate management at 
the expense of shareholders’ rights.163 Indeed, to avoid overpowering 
directors without shareholder approval, states could amend their 
statute to require that any rights plan adopted outside the context of 
an undervalued tender offer must be approved by a majority of the 
company’s shareholders.164 Under this mandate, a board under fire 
would still have a prerogative to adopt a poison pill; yet, it would 
avoid any conflict of interest and ensure that the choice is in the 
owners’ best interest. Therefore, boards would maintain an active 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Seretakis, supra note 135, at 270–71; see also William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (progressing the author’s “race to the bottom 
theory” in which he proposes that Delaware’s appetite for revenues from incorporations has led the state 
to establish a lenient corporate law; this subsequently influenced other states that are now competing in 
a “race to the bottom”). 
 163. Professor Eisenberg said, “[c]orporat[ion] law is constitutional law.” Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1969). Though it may be a slight exaggeration, states should be hesitant to ever defy the core 
principles of corporate law. 
 164. This could also be accomplished through corporate procedures, and, in fact some corporations do 
have “precatory (non-binding) resolutions actually voted on to redeem poison pills or to put them to a 
stockholder vote.” FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.02 [C][1]. However, despite an upward 
trend in these voting resolutions late in the Twentieth Century, they have “diminished rapidly” in more 
recent years “with only 6 resolutions voted on in 2008 (3 passed), 8 in 2009 (5 passed), [and] 5 in 2010 
(2 passed).” Id. 
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role in corporate defense while preserving corporate democracy. 
Furthermore, requiring shareholders’ approval would clarify the 
judicial review of poison pills. Notably, activist investors could no 
longer attempt to enjoin a poison pill by asserting that the board’s 
primary purpose in its adoption was to gain unnecessary leverage or 
ensure incumbency. 
Of course, the business judgment rule would still be applicable. As 
a preliminary matter, the court would review the board’s 
recommendation to adopt the pill under Unocal. Also, assuming the 
pill does not have an automatic expiration, courts could conclude that 
a board of directors breached its fiduciary duty by not redeeming the 
plan in an appropriate timeframe. 
3.   Shareholders 
Regardless of state law and common law jurisprudence, the most 
significant check on poison pill implementation remains the 
shareholders themselves. Indeed, equity owners are the pulse of 
corporations and thereby have the capacity to direct corporate policy 
and hold management accountable through their right to vote.165 
“A basic incident of stock ownership is the right to make decisions 
about who is to control the corporation, and whether to sell shares to 
a person seeking to acquire control of the company.”166 By and large, 
any change in management will also mean a change in direction. 
Transforming corporate practice should not be taken lightly; 
therefore, an imperative duty of major stockholders is to stay 
informed. Especially in the context of a rights pill adoption and 
upcoming proxy contest, owners should carefully consider the 
financial condition of the company, current managers’ attitudes and 
past behavior, the challenger’s proposals, the potential of long-term 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Through the voting process “shareholders elect and remove directors, amend articles of 
incorporation, and approve matters like mergers and consolidations, sale of substantially all assets, and 
dissolutions.” Jonathan Shub, Shareholder Rights Plans—Do They Render Shareholders Defenseless 
Against Their Own Management?, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 991, 1034 (1987). 
 166. Id. 
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costs versus the value of interim returns, and the opinion of any 
proxy advisory services.167 
Additionally, in states such as Georgia where continuing director 
provisions have been validated, dissident shareholders could amend 
corporate bylaws that prohibit management’s use of dead hand pills 
or even poison pills all together.168 Although, Invacare invalidated a 
hostile bidder’s proposed bylaw that would have dismantled the 
target’s poison pill defense, the court’s reasoning would not likely 
carry over to a bylaw proposed by investors outside the framework of 
a takeover attempt. However, if the decision was read so broadly as 
to hold all such mandatory bylaw amendments invalid under Georgia 
law, the necessity for the state’s legislature to take action in 
preserving the integrity of corporate law cannot be overemphasized. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the precarious nature of poison pills, the United States 
boasts one of the most successful economies in the world—a position 
it has achieved without allowing investors to acquire companies 
unqualifiedly. Indeed, the U.S. market will never bow to the potential 
dangers of unchallenged takeover bids, nor should it. Accordingly, 
poison pills are an enduring stamp on corporate America; yet, they 
should never be able to swallow the cornerstones of corporate law. 
The Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Third Point, however, 
threatens to do just that if applied too broadly. Therefore, it is time to 
deviate from director primacy and place the power to alter corporate 
structure back in the hands of shareholders. Such reform is crucial to 
the preservation of corporate constitutionalism, especially in states 
like Georgia where managerial favoritism runs rampant. 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Perhaps most notable, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS) examines poison pills under 
a formal rubric to ultimately recommend voting “Against” or “Withhold” in an election. INSTITUTIONAL 
S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., 2013 SRI U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES (2013); see also FLEISCHER & 
SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.02 [C][1] (listing the factors considered in ISS’s review). 
 168. Remember, according to Georgia law, dead hand provisions can only remain non-redeemable for 
180 days. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014). Thus, the preceding voting discussion is still effective and 
perhaps even more important in Georgia. 
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